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Introduction.
Historically, it has been common for liberals to hold that the private sphere of activity must be protected
against state interference in order to maximize individual freedom.1 The family is usually assumed to fall
within the private sphere of activity, and thus liberal theorists commonly hold that the family should be
immune from state intervention, except where there are clear violations of the rights of family members
(such as in cases of physical abuse). Some non-liberal theorists – Plato, for instance – have proposed the
dissolution of the private family.2 But, for the most part, liberal theorists have accepted the private family
as an immutable fact of social life.
In recent and contemporary liberal theory, however, the family3 has become a site of contention.
This has become clear in criticisms leveled at John Rawls’ influential works A Theory of Justice
and Political Liberalism. Feminists have argued that the family, as we know it, falls short of justice
and have worried about the effects of the institution of the family on women and girls.4 First,
feminist critics have held that if women and girls are to truly be ensured equal treatment, then
Rawlsian liberalism must be less tolerant of sexist non-public associations (including sexist and
patriarchal families). Second, feminist critics have argued that even families which are not explicitly
sexist or patriarchal are typically unfair for women and girls. Third, feminists have argued that both
sexist and standard families fail to adequately provide for the moral development of children, and
thus fail to fulfill one of the main tasks assigned to the family in Rawlsian liberalism.5 If feminist
critics are right, it is no small matter for the Rawlsian.6 If feminists are right in the first case, the
Rawlsian will have to either have to concede that her version of liberalism is insufficient in
guaranteeing equal treatment for all of society’s members, or she will have to give up on allowing
individuals wide latitude in the associations they choose and the conceptions of the good they
endorse. Neither option is very palatable. And if feminists are right in the second and third cases,
the Rawlsian’s commitments to the principles of fairness might commit her to weakening or
abolishing the family in the well-ordered society. And if the family is to be significantly weakened
or abolished, some alternative will have to be provided for raising children and providing for their
moral development. That is, society will have to re-ordered in a more radical way than the Rawlsian
may have previously recognized.
In what follows, I will defend the family in Rawlsian liberalism against the above-mentioned
criticisms. I hold that feminists should not be eager to abandon the institution of the family nor
should they be eager to significantly weaken family autonomy and family privacy. The Rawlsian, it
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seems, cannot license public institutions to be fully responsible for the raising of children because
of the role that conceptions of the good play in moral development. But other alternatives to the
family are just as likely, if not more likely, to fail in just the ways the family does. Finally, I hold
that the family provides the space for individuals to exercise their capacity to be partial. The
exercise of that capacity, I hold, is best thought of as a primary good. The basic structure of the
well-ordered society should be organized so as to secure this good for all individuals, and the best
way to do this seems to be to allow for significant family autonomy and family privacy.
I. Rawlsian Liberalism and the Family.
In his 1971 landmark work, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls details a theory of “justice as fairness”
which is meant to “generalize and carry to a higher level of abstraction the traditional conception of
the social contract” (p. xv, PL; p. 3, TJ). Traditional contract theory, as found in the works of such
thinkers as Locke, Hobbes, Kant and Rousseau, had explained the legitimacy of socio-political
arrangements in terms of putative contracts entered into by the members of particular communities.
Socio-political arrangements were legitimate and basically just, that is, if they were the result of
freely chosen agreements among the adult members of a community. But critics like Hume had
raised problems for thinking of social contracts either as hypothetical constructs or as actual
historical events.
In Rawls’ theory, the foundational agreement is performed as a thought experiment. Principles of
justice are justified as those which would be chosen in “an initial situation of equality,” the Original
Position (p. 21, TJ). In the Original Position, self-interested (though not selfish) rational choosers
do not have knowledge concerning their natural and social assets, their particular conceptions of the
good, their psychological make-ups, or the particulars of their society (p. 137, TJ). This veil of
ignorance ensures that the hypothetical choice situation is fair and individuals in it are free and
equal. While the agreement reached in the OP is hypothetical, Rawls holds that the justification it
provides is not merely hypothetical. Since the OP best models a situation of fairness, the principles
chosen there are those that best approximate the justifiable “limits on fair terms of social
cooperation” (p. 21, TJ).
The principles of justice Rawls endorses as those which would be chosen by parties to OP are the
following:
(1) Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is
compatible with a similar scheme for all;7 (Liberty Principle, or LP)
(2) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) first, they must be
attached to offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Equal
Opportunity Principle or EOP); and (b) second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society (Difference Principle, or DP) (p. 291, PL).8
The basic liberties mentioned in LP include individual freedom of thought and liberty of
conscience, political liberties and freedom of association, the rights and liberties required by the rule
of law, as well as “the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person,” (presumably
including such liberties as the right to privacy) (p. 291, PL). Moreover, Rawls recognizes an
ordering of these principles such that the first principle of justice outweighs the second principle. In
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/mckeen.html[9/18/2009 5:08:57 PM]
TJ, Rawls calls this a ‘lexical ordering’ of the two principles which requires that the first principle
be satisfied before the second. As Rawls sees it, this ordering entails that basic rights and liberties
cannot be traded off to correct for social or economic inequalities, nor for perfectionist reasons or
reasons of public welfare (pp. 42-43, TJ; p. 61, TJ; pp. 294-299, PL).
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls recognizes the family as part of the basic structure of society and as
crucially implicated in the development of the moral development of individuals (p. 7 and pp. 458-
504, TJ; p. 258, PL). However, Rawls also notes that while features of the basic structure are under
some control of the principles of justice (LP, EOP, and DP), we need not think that the principles of
justice directly govern the internal workings of families, or churches, universities, or voluntary
associations. He writes:
There is no reason to suppose ahead of time that the principles satisfactory for the basic
structure hold for all cases. These principles may not work for the rules and practices of
private associations or for those of less comprehensive social groups. They may be
irrelevant for the various informal conventions and customs of everyday life (p. 8, TJ).
In Political Liberalism, Rawls holds that “[t]he role of institutions that belong to the basic structure
is to secure just background conditions against which the actions of individuals and associations
take place” (p. 266, PL). As in TJ, the principles of justice apply to elements of the basic structure
by “imposing certain constraints,” for example, by disallowing violations of certain basic liberties.
But here too, Rawls denies that the principles of justice accepted for society as a whole must
internally order all sub-elements within that society (p. 468, PL). Thus, for example, voluntary
organizations are not required to distribute their resources such that the least advantaged in these
organizations will benefit (as per DP). In contrast, resources which belong in common to everyone
in a given society will, presumably, be subject to DP.
But what determines the reach and influence of the principles of political justice? Why should we
think that these principles are directly applicable to the workings of certain social institutions, but
not to others? What principled distinction can be drawn here between the “political world” of
elections, positions of authority, and common resources and the “non-political” world of
associations, churches and families? These questions are directly relevant to feminist criticisms of
Rawls on the family. Feminists have criticized Rawls for failing to apply the principles of justice
more completely to the family. And both feminists and egalitarians have criticized Rawls for failing
to fully appreciate how the institution of the monogamous family may influence and undermine
social justice. Let us now examine these criticisms in some detail.
II. The Family as A Non-Public Institution.
In the following sections, I will consider three lines of feminist criticism against Rawls on the
family. These criticisms have been forcefully laid out by Susan Moller Okin, and I will concentrate
on her arguments in what follows.
In addition, I make an interpretive assumption about the relation between Rawls’ A Theory of
Justice and Political Liberalism: I assume that these two works are largely consistent with one
another and that PL is best read as a continuation and expansion of TJ, not as a repudiation of it. Of
course, PL does depart from TJ on one significant issue – where TJ assumes a comprehensive
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account of justice shared by all members of a society, PL makes no such assumption. Instead, PL
only holds that an “overlapping consensus” about justice must be secured (p. xix, PL). In PL, Rawls
means to take more seriously “the fact of reasonable pluralism,” the fact that democratic societies
are characterized by deep and enduring differences in conceptions of the good and ways of living
(p. xvi-xviii, xxxvii, xxxix, PL). The main problem PL sets out to address is how to provide for the
stability of a democratic and well-ordered society given this sort of pluralism (p. 4, PL).9
In addressing this problem, Rawls distinguishes between public/political life, which is governed by
public reason and the political conception of justice, and non-public/non-political life, in which
different conceptions of the good are freely endorsed and acted on by individuals and groups (p.
137, PL). If they are to be stable and lasting, democratic regimes must secure agreement on the
political conception of justice which governs public life. But democratic regimes should expect no
such agreement in non-public life. Individuals in democratic regimes will disagree in their religious,
philosophical and moral views; they will have different cultural and ethnic backgrounds; they will
have different interests, hobbies, affiliations, attachments and loyalties; they will participate in
divergent family structures and raise their children in distinct ways.10
Feminists takes issue precisely with the distinction Rawls draws between the public/political and
non-public/non-political. There are two main ways that feminists have questioned the public/private
distinction: (a) by doubting whether a principled and non-sexist distinction can really be drawn
between the allegedly public and the allegedly private;11 (b) by doubting that the family is really
private, even if the public/private distinction can be sensibly drawn.
So Okin holds that “the family is a social institution that defies [Rawls’] political/nonpolitical
dichotomy” (p. 27, Okin 1994).12 On Okin’s account, the family is political in at least two ways: (i)
Questions of power, distribution of resources, and differences of interest13 are at least as relevant
within families as they are outside of families; (ii) Families have significant social and political
effects. As Rawls has it, elements of the basic structure have, “deep and long-term social effects
and in fundamental ways shape citizen’s character and aims, the kinds of persons they are and
aspire to be” (p. 68, PL). It is, furthermore, plausible to think that the family has greater influence
on the character and aims of individuals than other elements of the basic structure, such as the
structure of markets. Thus, Okin holds that the family should not be immune to the principles of
justice in the well-ordered society.
Understanding Okin’s criticism here helps, I think, to head off a misguided objection. Defenders of
Rawls (including Rawls himself) have alleged that Okin misunderstands justice as fairness by
arguing that, since families are part of the basic structure, they should be strongly subject to the
principles of justice. These defenders point out that since Rawlsian liberalism allows that
institutions can be part of the basic structure without being internally ordered by the principles of
justice, there is no reason to think that the family must be internally ordered by the principles of
justice.14 That is, individual families need not be accountable to the public conception of justice but
may be largely autonomous in how they are organized, how family decisions are made, and how
family resources are allocated.
These responses, however, miss the force of Okin’s objection. It is true that if the institution of the
family, as we know it, is to be retained in the well-ordered society, it will be largely autonomous.
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But this response begs the question against the feminist critics of Rawls. Feminists wonder
precisely whether an institution like the contemporary family should be retained in the well-ordered
society, or whether the well-ordered society should revise or replace the institution of the family as
we know it. Defenders of Rawlsian liberalism, then, cannot simply assert that the family is non-
public and thus is only subject to minimal constraints from the principles of justice. They must
justify regarding the family as a non-public institution in this way.
III. Reasonable Pluralism, Marriage and the Freedom of Association.
Rawls allows for a broad spectrum of comprehensive doctrines in the well-ordered society. For
example, Rawls is willing to admit into the well-ordered society “various religious sects [which]
oppose the culture of the modern world and wish to lead their common life apart from its unwanted
influences” (p. 199, PL). Such sects should be tolerated in the well-ordered society, on Rawls’
view, just in case their members abide by the political conception of justice and are willing to
defend their public claims on grounds acceptable to those who do not affirm their comprehensive
doctrine.15 Furthermore, Rawls requires that these sects allow that children are educated so that they
understand the public principles of justice, and their education “should prepare them to be fully
cooperative members of society and enable them to be self-supporting” (p. 199, PL).16
But Rawls also holds that the well-ordered society is not obligated to tolerate comprehensive
doctrines that are unreasonable (p. 210, PL). Reasonable doctrines are those that are consistent with
the political conception of justice and those that respect the limits this conception imposes.17 Rawls
allows that families, religions and non-public groups which are sexist or patriarchal may nonetheless
qualify as having reasonable comprehensive doctrines as long as they do not attempt to over-reach
the limits of the public conception of justice.
In contrast, unreasonable comprehensive doctrines have the following features: such doctrines (a)
advocate or involve the violation of basic rights and liberties, as these are affirmed in the public
principles of justice; (b) work to undermine the political conception of justice; (c) don’t allow for
the adequate development of the two central moral powers of persons, the capacity to formulate a
comprehensive doctrine of the good and a sense of justice; (d) advance claims that cannot be
justified on the grounds of public reason (pp. 174-210; p.187; p. 190; p. 209, PL).18 Impermissible
conceptions of the good are thus somehow incompatible with the principles of political justice (p.
180, p. 196, PL).
Okin finds, however, that religious sects as those Rawls mentions are “typically highly patriarchal,
they advocate and practice the dependency and submissiveness of women” (p. 31, Okin 1994). As
such, Okin holds that Rawls should regard such sects as championing unreasonable comprehensive
doctrines in their views about women and girls. On the other hand, Okin argues, if Rawlsian
liberalism affirms wide tolerance for sexist comprehensive doctrines, it betrays its commitment to
equal political and civil liberties for women and girls. Thus, Okin holds that there is a tension
between the Rawlsian commitment to tolerance for divergent comprehensive doctrines and its
commitment to securing equality in basic rights for individuals. Okin advocates resolving the
tension in favor of equality (p. 32, Okin 1994).
But let us clarify matters here. I think we must first separate out two questions: Is the family
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inimical to the interests of women? and: Is the family inimical to the interests of girls? As we shall
see, the family functions quite differently for adult women than it does for children. Let us handle
the situation of adult women with respect to the family first. For the Rawlsian, the family is a
voluntary association for adults, including adult women. In this respect, families are like other
voluntary non-public associations (religions, club, social groups, etc.) (p. 221, 301, 468, PL). Adult
citizens in a well-ordered society may choose whether or not to subject themselves to the authority
of a church or an organization. And, in protecting the freedom of conscience and freedom of
association, the well-ordered society also protects the rights of a citizen to divest herself from an
association, to cease practicing a given religion, or to change her mind about fundamental moral or
philosophical issues (p. 221, fn. 8, PL).19
Similarly, in a well-ordered society, adults can choose whether to be married, to remain single, or
to divorce. Families can no more violate the basic rights and liberties of individuals than other non-
political associations can. “The equal rights of women and the basic rights of their children as future
citizens,” Rawls holds “are inalienable and protect them wherever they are” (p. 471, PL). In this
way, Rawls does not regard the family as a private sphere completely immune from public scrutiny
or governmental interference. “If the so-called private sphere is alleged to be a space exempt from
justice,” Rawls writes, “then there is no such thing” (p. 471, PL).20
In addition to affirming the rights of individuals to marry or not marry, the Rawlsian affirms the
right of individuals to choose among a variety of family forms in the well-ordered society. Thus,
individuals may choose to have traditional marriages in which husbands are the “heads of the
family”. In these families, husbands would be assigned the role of primary bread-winners and
primary decision-makers, whereas wives would be assigned primary responsibility for housework
and childcare, and might also be expected to respect the authority of their husbands.21 Individuals
might also choose to have marriages in which decision-making is more equally shared. Individuals
might choose to have marriages in which household tasks and childcare are more equally shared.
Individuals might choose to have marriages in which both husband and wife work outside the
home, and childcare is at least partly the responsibility of someone other than the parents.
Individuals might choose not to have children. Individuals might choose same-sex partners.22 The
acceptable forms of family life are broad and diverse for the Rawlsian.
Consider a woman who we will call Fatima. Fatima has been raised in an orthodox religion. She
marries a man also raised within this orthodox religion. Let us say that the orthodox religion here
holds that men are morally and intellectually superior to women. Say further that Fatima enters into
a marriage of the kind endorsed by her religion, one where the wife is expected to acquiesce to the
will of her husband.
As objectionable as we might find this comprehensive doctrine, we have no ready reason to
condemn this comprehensive doctrine as unreasonable on Rawlsian grounds. As long as adherents
to this religion abide by the public conception of justice – as long as adherents, for example, make
no claim that the strict rules of their religion apply to all members of society – the Rawlsian will
find it necessary to tolerate this comprehensive doctrine. The Rawlsian recommends extreme
conservativism when it comes to placing comprehensive doctrines beyond the pale of
reasonableness, because such moves are so likely to be arbitrary and to violate the first principle of
justice (LP). Feminists cannot claim that sexist comprehensive doctrines are unreasonable, then, for
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the fact that they are sexist. While feminists might object to the comprehensive doctrines that are
endorsed by sexist or patriarchal non-public associations, a Rawlsian feminist must tolerate these
doctrines as long as those committed to these doctrines are willing to abide by the fair terms of
cooperation with others in society.23
At this juncture, some may be tempted to respond that families are not voluntary for women in the
way the Rawlsian assumes. One might hold that Fatima, for example, does not freely choose a
traditional marriage because everything in her upbringing, her family, and her cultural background
encourages her to believe that women should be subservient to men, that women must marry, and
that women should assume traditional roles within marriages. This worry should be taken seriously,
I think, because it is no doubt true that women often act under the pressure of socialization when
they choose traditional marriages, or any marriage for that matter.24 And this worry really asks us to
look more closely at socialization and moral development of children (which we will do presently).
The Rawlsian, however, will assume that adult women are, by and large, free and equal citizens and
thus are capable of choosing to join or exit non-public associations such as families.
The Rawlsian holds that nearly all adults possess to a sufficient degree the moral powers which will
allow them to make autonomous choices. These moral powers are: (a) the capacity to form and
revise one’s conception of the good and (b) a sense of justice. A Rawlsian must, of course, make
provision for individuals who do not possess the requisite moral capacities because of, e.g., mental
deficiency or illness. Individuals who are deficient in the two moral powers, for example, might not
be allowed to enter into contracts or be held to the same standards of responsibility and consent as
other citizens.25 The well-ordered state may also not grant the full measure of rights and liberties to
individuals who are deficient in this way.26 Such individuals, for example, may be prevented from
getting married at all.
Might a feminist want to claim that, as a result of her upbringing, a woman raised in an orthodox
religion cannot undertake a traditional marriage as a voluntary venture? This would be a perilous
line of argument. We should be extremely cautious in assuming that an individual must be morally
defective if she makes a choice with which we disagree. Individuals must be assumed to possess the
requisite level of moral development unless strong reasons can be provided for thinking otherwise.
For, to view a person as not responsible in this way is to regard her as something less than a free
and equal citizen. It is to view her as someone not capable of participating in the cooperative
venture that is the well-ordered society (p. 33, p. 74, PL).
Thus, if Fatima is thought to be incapable of voluntarily entering into an orthodox marriage, then
she must also be thought incapable of voluntarily entering into any other marriage (even a more
egalitarian one), as well as incapable of assuming the rights and duties of a free and equal citizen.27
The Rawlsian can grant that women’s choices of traditional marriages might be shaped or
influenced by their upbringing and cultural background, but the bar for regarding such choices as
non-autonomous is set quite high. As long as individual’s moral powers have been developed to the
minimum requisite degree, her choices must be respected by the state.28
I conclude that Okin’s tension is dissolved. Holding an illiberal doctrine is not sufficient to count as
actively undermining the political conception of justice. Thus feminists cannot hold that sexist
doctrines are unreasonable unless adherents to these doctrines actively undermine the political
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conception of justice. If marriages are voluntary and any violations of basic rights that may occur
within families justify state interference, there appears to be no obvious tension between freedom of
conscience and freedom of association, on the one hand, and the protection of basic rights and
liberties for women, on the other. In the well-ordered society, women are not coerced or forced into
marriages; they enter into marriages of their own accord, and may exit marriages without penalty.
The basic rights of women are protected within and without marriage.
If feminists are to respect women as free and equal persons, they must also respect their ability to
choose comprehensive doctrines and non-public associations that are non-feminist. It would be
implausible and dangerous to hold that adult women who participate in sexist associations are,
thereby, deficient in the moral powers required for making free choices.
IV. Gendered Divisions of Labor in Families.
Feminists are not only troubled by families that adopt explicitly sexist or patriarchal comprehensive
doctrines. They are also troubled by ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ families that do not avow explicitly
sexist or patriarchal comprehensive doctrines. Rawls assumes in TJ that most families are, by and
large, characterized by fairness and by relationships of love and trust.29 And in PL, Rawls reaffirms
this claim: “I do assume that in some form the family is just” (p. xxix, PL). But he offers no
evidence or argument for the claim that the contemporary form of the family is just. Feminist critics
of Rawls, on the other hand, have doubted whether the institution of the family as we know it is
just. Specifically, they have wondered whether the family as characterized by a gendered division of
labor is just. Historically, women have assumed a disproportionately large share of housework and
childcare within families. This is still true today, even in households where both the wife and
husband work full-time.30
One consequence of this unequal division of domestic labor is that married women do more unpaid
work than married men. Another consequence is that married men have more leisure time than
married women. Studies also suggest that the gendered division of domestic labor affects women in
the workplace. Because women are the primary care-givers within families, it is argued, they are
less able to invest their time and energy into developing marketable skills. As primary care-givers,
women are also apt to choose jobs which offer flexibility, even where these jobs offer less pay or
benefits. For these reasons, women tend to be segregated into low-wage, low-status jobs where
these jobs offer minimal job security and little chance for advancement.31 To some degree, these
factors may explain why American women, on the whole, earn on average 23% less than what men
earn.32 These factors may also explain the different economic fates of men and women who divorce
– while men generally find themselves in a stronger economic position, women generally find
themselves in a weaker economic position after divorce.33
One might well question whether families in which women earn less and do more unpaid labor are
truly just. The standard gendered family is open to critique from two Rawlsian perspectives: (1)
from the perspective of an adult woman choosing whether to participate in a typically gendered
family; and (2) from the perspective of the Original Position. Considering the family from the first
perspective, it seems that similar considerations govern as those regarding families that avow non-
feminist comprehensive doctrines. That is, gendered families will be regarded by the Rawlsian as
voluntary associations and adult women may opt in or opt out of these associations. As long as the
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well-ordered society ensures that women are not unjustly coerced into such arrangements and as
long as society ensures that women are not unjustly penalized if they leave such arrangements, it
seems that the Rawlsian must respect the right of adult women to freely choose such arrangements.
These choices must be regarded as expressions of a woman’s fundamental right to free
association.34
This response may strike feminists as insufficient since it, arguably, does not account for economic
pressures or socialization pressures. We will talk more about socialization and child development
below. As for economic pressures, it seems open to the Rawlsian to allow that economic
inequalities such as those resulting from divorce might be handled by the Difference Principle. That
is, such inequalities might be mitigated if they can be shown to benefit the least well-off -- in the
current economic climate, divorced or single women and their children.
Considering the institution of the family from the Original Position asks us to consider whether
parties in a situation of initial fairness would approve the family as an element in the basic structure
of the well-ordered society. The first perspective assumes that the family is already part of the basic
structure and asks whether or not adult women are free to participate in it. To consider the family
from the perspective of the Original Position, in contrast, asks us to consider whether the family as
we know it should be revised or even eliminated. One might think that the Original Position does
not recommend the typical gendered family. It seems, that is, unlikely that free and equal
individuals acting behind the veil of ignorance would choose an institution in which it might turn
out that they had responsibility for the greatest share of unpaid labor while being made
economically vulnerable in the process.
But parties to OP should not be thought to be choosing between families characterized by a
gendered division of labor and families that are not so characterized. Presumably, parties to OP will
choose whether or not to allow marriages as voluntary associations in the well-ordered society and
it will be up to individuals whether these marriages are characterized by a gendered division of
labor or not.
In addition, however, parties to the OP will choose whether or not to allow voluntary marriages but
families, where these are non-public associations which include children. In TJ, families are charged
with the moral development of children. One important question, then, will be whether or not the
functions of the family are best handled by institutions other than the family, either public or non-
public. We will consider whether parties to OP would affirm the institution of the family as we
know it, by considering the role of the family in moral development.
V. The Family as a School for (In)Justice.
While the Rawlsian views marriages and families as voluntary associations for adult women, she
cannot regard families as voluntary associations for children since children are not autonomous in
the way required to enter or exit non-public associations. In addition, it is precisely the family that
is normally charged with developing the sort of autonomy in children that will later enable them to
participate in voluntary associations on free terms. We can head off a quick objection here. One
might be tempted to say that, because children cannot participate in families with full autonomy
that families are coercive arrangements for children, and thus that families are unjust on this basis.
But, of course, until children develop the capacity for autonomous decision-making, any association
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of which they are a part will not be fully voluntary for them. Here we must appeal to what is in a
child’s interests until the child becomes an adult who can determine her own interests and choose
accordingly.35
Okin, John Stuart Mill, and other feminists have worried that the family as we know it is a poor
“school for justice”. The line of argument here is the following: moral development in children
requires families that operate on fair principles. Families that are characterized by a gendered
division of labor do not appear to be governed by fair principles (perhaps because individuals could
be expected to choose against such arrangements in the OP.) Families that are not governed by fair
principles cannot reliably inculcate an effective sense of justice in children. Therefore, the
contemporary institution of the family – that is, the dominant, gendered form of the family – cannot
reliably inculcate an effective sense of justice in children.
The problem here seems to be two-fold. For one, feminist critics hold that gendered families do not
adequately develop an effective sense of justice in either boy or girl children. Okin notes a study
which finds that, in homes where the division of domestic labor is very unequal36 , adolescent girl
children do 25% more in household chores than girls in other households. Boys in these households
do 60% less in household chores than boys in other households. Okin concludes: “Since it is
difficult to imagine that the extra work on the part of the girls is purely voluntary, it seems that the
boys are learning the pattern of family injustice established by their own fathers and, like them,
[are] getting away with as little as possible” (p. 36, Okin 1994). The idea here seems to be that
children who are raised in families with an unfair division of household labor along gender lines are
likely to reproduce this pattern. This concern is likely to extend to families where the gendered
divisions are not so pronounced. The worry, I take it, is that girls will fail to develop an effective
sense of justice because they will fail to count their own interests strongly enough; whereas boys
will fail to develop an effective sense of justice because they will learn to exploit and take
advantage of others.
The other, related concern is that gendered families create special barriers for girl children which
undermine their status as free and equal citizens in the well-ordered society. If girls are taught that
they are less valuable and that their interests are less important than those of their male counterparts,
they may consequently fail to be able to realize the full extent of their talents and abilities. In this
way, fair equality of opportunity may be denied to women. Girls may also be undermined in their
capacity for self-respect which is, as Rawls notes, the most important primary good (pp. 440-446,
TJ; pp. 318-320, PL). In TJ Rawls claims that, given the over-riding importance of self-respect, “the
parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that
undermine self-respect” (p. 440, TJ). If, therefore, the family as we know it is a key part of the
social conditions that serve to undermine self-respect in women and girls (as some feminists claim),
it seems to follow that the well-ordered society should weaken or abandon the family as an
institution.37
Before we discuss the responses to these arguments, let us understand the importance of the
development of the two central moral capacities for the Rawlsian (a sense of justice and a capacity
for a conception of the good).38 These moral capacities are essential for the well-ordered society in
at least two ways. First, it is in virtue of these moral capacities that persons are free and equal (p.
19, pp. 30-34, p. 109, PL). Persons are free in that they can choose their ends, develop a rational
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plan of life in accordance with these ends, can rework their ends and commitments, and can be held
responsible for the ends they choose. In virtue of their moral capacities, persons are also regarded as
equal and thus can be included as full participants in a well-ordered society, a fair system of
cooperation that extends over generations (p. 18-19, PL).
Secondly, Rawls holds that development in individuals of a minimally effective sense of justice is
necessary to ensure the long-term stability of the well-ordered society (pp. 141-142, PL; pp. 453-
458, TJ). Individuals in the well-ordered society must have, as it were, a sense of fair play. They
must be willing to offer fair terms of cooperation justified in terms others can agree to (thus not on
the basis of any particular comprehensive doctrine of the good). And individuals must be willing to
abide by the terms of fair agreement, even when this may sometimes mean that some of their own
interests are not accommodated (p. xlii, p. 16-17, p. 86, PL; p. 467, TJ). Having an effective sense
of justice allows individuals to resist the temptation to benefit unfairly at the expense of others (p.
142, PL). If many individuals lacked such a sense of justice, society would fail to work as a
cooperative enterprise.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls makes the family central in moral development. He holds that the
family provides the basic relationships of love and trust which ground self-worth and encourages the
desire to act fairly (pp. 458-512, TJ). Children first learn to follow moral norms through the wish to
please their parents (the morality of authority). Children next develop ties of friendship and
association. They learn to function in small cooperative groups and to evaluate their own
performances with respect to their responsibilities within these groups (the morality of
associations). Finally, individuals learn a morality of higher-order principles. In this final stage,
“moral attitudes are no longer connected solely with the well-being and approval of particular
individuals and groups, but are shaped by a conception of the right chosen irrespective of these
contingencies” (p. 475, TJ). This final stage allows persons to be governed by principles, such that
“we want to live with others on terms that everyone would recognize as fair from a perspective all
would accept as reasonable” (p. 478, TJ).
Okin approves of the picture of moral development from TJ, but doubts whether the family (as we
know it) adequately ensures that development. Several commentators have responded to Okin on
this point by noting that Rawls’ account of moral psychology requires that individuals only achieve
a minimum sense of justice.39 While it might be plausible that families organized on fair principles
are likely to be better at inculcating a sense of justice in children, commentators have doubted
whether such families are necessary for inculcating a minimum sense of justice. Children raised in
highly gendered families, for example, do seem capable of developing a minimally effective sense
of justice – if not a lively sense of justice. But I think all Okin need say here is that families
organized on fair principles will be more reliable at producing a minimally effective sense of justice
in children. A child may develop a sense of justice in an unjust family, but this may be regarded as
a largely fortuitous occurrence. The well-ordered society for the Rawlsian will be one where a
minimally effective sense of justice is reliably produced, not one where it only fortuitously occurs.
Parties to the OP, then, should be concerned with whether including the non-public family as an
element in the basic structure will be the most reliable way to develop the two key moral powers in
children. Okin holds that the family, at least the family characterized by a gendered division of
labor, will not be a reliable way to inculcate these two moral powers. I should note here that Okin
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does not explicitly call for the abolition of the institution of the family on Rawlsian grounds. She
does claim that, in some way, families must be made just. But she does not specify how this is to
be done. How might the well-ordered society counter gendered inequalities in families? One way
would be to allow for greater state interference – that is, to reduce the degree of autonomy and
privacy that families have enjoyed.40
VI. Family Autonomy, Family Privacy and Alternatives to the Family.
Here, again, it seems that we should view the family from the perspective of the OP. What we are
asking, then, is whether the family should be allowed in the basic structure and, if allowed, what
provision should be made for it. The choice, again, will not be of the gendered family per se since
parties to the OP will not dictate such specific family forms. But parties to the OP may be expected
to rule on such features as family autonomy and family privacy. I understand these as follows:
Family Autonomy (FA): Families are autonomous when adults in those families are
permitted to make important decisions such as regarding the way children within those
families are raised, what comprehensive doctrine(s) are adopted by the family, what
influences are desirable for children in the family, what cultural identity is promoted,
what language is spoken at home, what methods of discipline are used, what schools
children attend, where the family is to live, etc.
Family Privacy (FP): Families are private when the decisions adults in those families
make are not, in general, expected to conform to the dictates of public debate and where,
often, those decisions are not open to public scrutiny in the first place.41
Family autonomy and privacy, then, should be understood as limiting the power of the state with
respect to families and children within families. FA and FP do not, by themselves, license gendered
divisions in the family. But one can well see how FA and FP might allow gendered families to
exist by protecting the decisions adults in such families may make. So, while parties to the OP
cannot strictly choose against gendered families, the considerations Okin raises might convince
parties to choose to weaken or reject FA and FP. Weakening FA and FP would have the
consequence that more state scrutiny and control of families would be allowed beyond the
prevention of violations of LP. Rejecting FA and FP might, in effect, abolish the family as we
know it.
But I think feminists should be reluctant to significantly weaken family autonomy. Say that the
prevailing culture is sexist, as many feminists believe, and portrays women and girls in derogatory
ways. With strong family autonomy, feminist parents are empowered to limit these influences on
their girl and boy children and, to some degree, shield children from such sexist influences. If FA is
weakened, parents may not be empowered to make decisions about what media children see, what
social roles are portrayed as desirable to children (princess, super-model, GI Joe), and what ideals
and values are promoted to children. Public intrusions into the family might be designed to further
gender equality, but it seems just as likely that such public intrusions might serve to help to
socialize children in ways feminists find objectionable.
Feminist critics might hold that defects with the family justify doing away with the family entirely
in the well-ordered society. In this case we are owed some account of what institutions would be
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responsible for the raising of children and for children’s moral development, in the absence of the
family as we know it. There appear to be two main choices here. We might hold that public
institutions should be primarily responsible for the raising of children. Or we might assign this
responsibility to non-public institutions. Should we think that public institutions will be more likely
to guarantee equal opportunity for girls than the non-public families? Recent studies have shown
that girls are systematically treated unequally in public schools.42 One may worry that family
autonomy and family privacy helps to shield conditions which are detrimental to fair equal
opportunity for girls. But it seems just as plausible that state-run institutions might fail as regularly
as families do.
But the first option seems to be a non-starter for more fundamental reasons. Ron Mallon, and Will
Kymlicka, for example, argue that children need to be provided with starting points in their moral
development, if they are to develop their capacity to form and revise a conception of the good.43
These starting points are provided by the comprehensive doctrines taught by families and cultures.
By being raised in a particular family (with a particular cultural identity), children have access to a
particular set of beliefs, values, ideals, traditions, social roles, attachments, etc. Children may come
to largely accept, largely reject, or more or less significantly revise the comprehensive doctrine they
are taught. However, as Mallon argues, it is necessary that children start with some comprehensive
doctrine. Without some starting comprehensive doctrine, the individual in question would be
incapable of developing a meaningful capacity for a conception of the good (p. 288, Mallon
1999).44 Public institutions cannot endorse particular comprehensive doctrines, in Rawls’ view,
since to do so would violate state neutrality. Therefore, given some plausible assumptions, public
institutions could not take over the moral development of children if the family were eliminated
from the basic structure.
This would leave non-public associations such as clubs, churches and professional organizations to
do the work of raising children, if we are to eliminate the institution of the family or significantly
weaken family autonomy and privacy. Again, I think one may plausibly worry whether such
institutions are any more reliable at developing children’s moral capacities than the family as we
know it. It seems that these associations may be just as apt to fail as families and as public
institutions. I do not assume that children could not be provided with close affective relationships in
such settings. But we should note two things: (a) it is unclear whether these associations will be
any more reliable at inculcating a minimal sense of justice and at developing a capacity for a
conception of the good than families characterized by FA and FP; (b) if we extend FA and FP to
these non-public associations they will, in effect, become families. As such, we do not have
convincing reasons to eliminate the family as we know it in favor of non-public associations
empowered to do the work of moral development.
Finally, I want to suggest an additional important reason for retaining the family and extending to it
some form of family autonomy and family privacy. It is this: We might well regard partiality as
central to our psychological and moral lives. Our particular attachments, relationships and loyalties
are often essentially implicated in what gives our lives meaning. The capacity to be partial, that is,
might be seen as a primary good in Rawlsian terms, as something we should want whatever else we
want. Rawls means for primary goods to be protected by the principles of justice chosen in the OP.
Insofar as the family is essentially characterized by such partiality, then, we might expect that
family relationships should receive some protection from parties to the OP. We may also regard
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partiality as importantly involved in moral development and the development of autonomy. It is
plausible, that is, that children develop a sense of justice, a capacity for a conception of the good,
and the ability to make autonomous decisions because they are treated with partiality (as well as
fairness) by adults who care for them. As Shoeman puts this point, “[Familial] privacy and
autonomy provide the moral space within which concrete personal relationships can be formed
independently of general social concerns” (p. 15, Shoeman 1980). Making such relationships
answerable to general social concerns inevitably weakens the foundation of partiality in which they
are rooted. Individuals, after all, cannot always be thinking of public concerns and public goods.
Rawlsian liberalism allows that there is a space of human life where individuals may freely exercise
their comprehensive doctrines and states do not have cause, in general, to make individuals subject
to public concern in their associations or beliefs. Similarly, it seems that Rawlsian liberalism should
recognize a space of human life where individuals are free of public concerns and may exercise
partiality freely. Families provide, paradigmatically, the space where individuals are able to exercise
and develop their capacity to be partial. Parties to the OP, therefore, would do well to preserve the
family in the basic structure of the well-ordered society and to extend to the family some robust
form of autonomy and privacy. While feminists are, no doubt, cognizant of the potential dangers
family autonomy and privacy involves, they should also recognize the value of partiality as a
primary good and seek to preserve it in the well-ordered society.
Catherine McKeen
SUNY College at Brockport
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1. Social contract theorists of the 17th-19th centuries were rigorous in their investigations of
political authority and legitimacy, and scrutinized such traditional grounds for political authority as
the natural right of kings. But they did not, by and large, extend their scrutiny to the institution of
the family. Locke, for example, vigorously challenged the paternal power traditionally granted to
monarchs, but did not issue any similar challenge to the paternal power exercised by fathers as
heads of families.
2. It appears that Plato only proposes this for the elites in his well-ordered society. See Book V,
Republic, trans. Desmond Lee, 2d edition, Penguin Books, 2003.
3. By ‘the family’ here I mean the social institution which consists of small non-public groups of
children and adults, where adults are primarily charged with the care, education and moral
development of the children within their own group, where the relationships between adults and
children are typically affective and close (at least over the life of the relationship), where adults
devote a substantial portion of their resources to the care and development of children in their own
group, and where the family is typically recognized as existing over time. The family as an
institution is also characterized by autonomy and privacy. That is, adults in families are typically
allowed a large measure of freedom from state interference in making decisions about their
children’s lives. These decisions are also typically not open to public scrutiny.
4. Feminist criticisms are discussed in works by Jane English, John Exdell, and Susan Moller Okin.
English, “Justice Between Generations,” Philosophical Studies 31, 1977, pp. 91-104; Exdell,
“Feminism, Fundamentalism, and Legitamacy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 3, 1994, pp. 441-
463; Okin, “Justice and Gender,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16, 1987, pp. 42-72; Okin,
“Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice,” Ethics, 99, 1989, pp. 229-249. See also, Karen
Green, “Rawls, Women and the Priority of Liberty,” Australian Journal of Philosophy, 64, suppl.
1986, pp. 26-36.
5. Other feminist critiques have focused on the theory of human nature attributed to political
liberalism. Feminists have criticized liberal political thinkers for being (a) overly individualistic in
their accounts of persons, for (b) overly valuing such traits as independence, autonomy and self-
sufficiency over cooperative virtues, for (c) illicitly assuming male actors under the guide of neutral
“persons”; and for (d) not sufficiently appreciating the embodiment of persons. I leave these
criticisms aside to deal with the criticisms that focus directly on the family and the public/non-
public distinction.
6. I focus on Rawlsian liberalism in this paper. However, it seems any version of liberalism which
endorses the family as a non-public institution which is largely exempt from state interference will
be open to similar criticisms. And there are other problems regarding the family in liberalism.
Egalitarian critics have argued that allowing for the family as a largely autonomous element in the
basic structure of society undermines a commitment to equal opportunity, since different family
positions will differentially affect individual’s opportunities and the use they may make of those
opportunities. I discuss this line of criticism elsewhere in a paper (tentatively) titled: “Should the
Rawlsian Keep the Family?”
7. This statement (taken from PL) differs somewhat from the statement of this principle in TJ. In
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Political Liberalism, Rawls also adds the following clause: “and in this scheme the equal political
liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value” (p. 5, PL). The details
concerning changes to the first principle of justice are not, by and large, important for the purposes
of this paper. I use the statements of the principles from PL simply because they represent Rawls’
most recent formulations.
8. The designations of the principles as LP, EOP, and DP are not included in the text of PL. I
include these for ease of reference.
9. The well-ordered society is characterized by three features (paraphrasing Rawls): (a) it is a
society where all citizens accept and know that others accept and publicly endorse common
principles of justice; (b) its basic structure – its main political and social institutions and how they
cohere as a system of cooperation – is publicly know to satisfy the principles of justice; (c) citizens
have a normally effective sense of justice – they can understand and apply the principles of justice;
they are motivated to comply with fair terms of cooperation; they are able to produce and evaluate
claims based on public reason (p. 35, pp. 201-202, PL).
10. While pluralism of this sort certainly poses a challenge for democratic regimes, Rawls does not
see such diversity as a regrettable fact of political life. Rather, he sees this diversity as “the
inevitable outcome of free human reason” when it is not suppressed (pp. 36-37 and p. xvi PL). The
only way a society would secure unified opinion on comprehensive doctrine would be through the
use of coercive, and illegitimate, state power (p. 37, PL). So, for Rawls, reasonable pluralism is a
sign of political health, not of disease.
11. See, e.g., Carole Pateman, “‘The Disorder of Women’: Women, Love, and the Sense of
Justice,” Ethics 91 (October 1980), pp. 20-34.
12. Susan Moller Okin, “Political Liberalism, Justice and Gender,” Ethics 105 (October 1994): pp.
23-43.
13. Heidi Hartmann explains well how both converging and divergent interests typify families under
capitalism in her “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive
Union,” from Women and Revolution, ed. Linda Sargent, South End Press, 1981.
14. Rawls makes this defense against Okin at pp. 468-470, PL. See also, pp. 274-275, De Wijze
1999, pp. 358-359, Lloyd 1994.
15. A doctrine’s having illiberal views seems neither necessary or sufficient for its being
unreasonable. A doctrine can hold illiberal views without acting in violation of the fair terms of
social cooperation. And a doctrine need have no explicit illiberal views, and its adherents yet may
act so as to undermine the fair terms of social cooperation by attempting to enforce their
comprehensive doctrine on others.
16. And Rawls’ main concern with such sects at IV.6.3 is that they educate children consistent with
the publicly-accepted principles of justice.
17. At some places, Rawls suggests more stringent limits on comprehensive doctrines. At PL p.
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176, for example, Rawls holds that “admissible ideas of the good must respect the limits of, and
serve a role within, the political conception of justice” (emphasis added). This condition appears to
go further than the minimal requirement that doctrines of the good do not contradict or undermine
the political conception of justice. So, a religious doctrine which endorses the moral and intellectual
superiority of men over women might very well pass on the minimal condition. But this doctrine
might very well fail on the more stringent condition. That is, it is very difficult to see how such a
doctrine would “serve a role within” the political conception of justice. It would be profitable to
work out whether weaker or stronger limits on comprehensive doctrines are better justified on
Rawlsian grounds. For the purposes of this paper, I will assume the weaker requirements apply.
18. We need not think that an unreasonable doctrine is characterized by all these features. For
example, reasonable doctrines may sometimes advance claims that cannot be justified on the
grounds of public reason. Such violations would not automatically condemn a comprehensive theory
of the good for being unreasonable. Furthermore, Rawls holds that comprehensive doctrines are
somehow governed by epistemological values such as consistency and openness to evidence.
19. The authority of a religion or other non-political association is thus provisional in the well-
ordered society in a way that political authority is not. All citizens are subject to the coercive
authority of the state, but citizens are only subject to the authority of a given church or association
by choice. Being a member of a society is not voluntary in at least two important ways: (1) one
does not join “society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into a
society where we will lead a complete life” (p. 41, PL); and (2) “the government’s authority cannot
be evaded except by leaving the territory over which it governs, and not always then” (p. 222, PL).
20. See De Wijze who criticizes feminists for ascribing an “immunity” interpretation of the family
to Rawls. I do not think this criticism applies to Okin’s argument. The issue here is not really
whether the private sphere is alleged to be completely immune from any state interference. A
complete immunity view is not a reasonable view and is not held by anyone, as far as I know. Such
a complete immunity view would, for example, make domestic and child abuse off limits for
coercive state interference. Rather, feminist want some justification for why the family should be
afforded the sorts of other protections it is afforded. That is, if the family really does have a
dramatic effect on the life prospects of individuals, and if, plausibly, contemporary family forms are
often unjust, how can one justify the institution of the family on liberal grounds?
21. I borrow this characterization from the way that Christian-based, conservative organizations
such as Focus On The Family describe ideal marriage and family relations. (See
www.focusonfamily.org.)
22. In TJ Rawls seems to only recognize the heterosexual, monogamous family (p. 7, TJ). In PL, he
extends consideration to alternative family forms. There Rawls claims: “[N]o particular form of the
family (monogamous, heterosexual, or otherwise) is required by a political conception of justice as
long as the family is arranged to fulfill [its] basic tasks effectively and doesn’t run afoul of other
political values” (p. 467, PL). It is an interesting question if Rawlsian liberalism would allow for
polygamous families.
23. It would be open to the feminist, of course, to give up some of the central commitments of
liberalism such as state neutrality regarding comprehensive doctrines. But in this paper I assume
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that we are working within a Rawlsian framework.
24. One may make a comparison here with cases of domestic violence. We know that even if
women are able, in some sense, to leave abusive marriages, they often do not do so. Economic
pressures often serve to keep women in such marriages. But we also know that early socialization
and childhood abuse can play a significant role in undermining the ability women have to leave
abusive relationships. Such cases raise important questions about agency and autonomy. It may be
that the Rawlsian does not have the resources to adequately address such questions.
25. Children, presumably, will be subject to special protections on these grounds. Rawls also
mentions those who are subject to a temporary or permanent illness or disability (p. 20, 21 PL; pp.
248-249, TJ).
26. Rawls writes: “Someone who has not developed and cannot exercise the moral powers to the
minimum requisite degree cannot be a normal and fully cooperating member of society over a
complete life” (p. 74, PL).
27. In some religions and cultures, it is common for girls to be married when they are quite young.
Feminists (and others) might plausibly be concerned that such marriages are not fully voluntary if
these girls have not yet reached an age where their moral powers are fully developed. It seems that
the well-ordered society might legitimately place certain age restrictions on marriage, at least where
marriage is understood as a civilly-recognized quasi-contractual arrangement which generates
certain rights and responsibilities.
28. The Rawlsian response, I believe, still leaves it open that feminists can interrogate agency and
autonomy. For example, feminists might still be concerned to explore whether there are measures
which could be taken to encourage the development of moral capabilities and autonomy beyond the
minimum required to count as a free and equal citizen. As long as such measures respect the
political conception of justice, the Rawlsian need not object to them.
29. However, Rawls also recognizes the possibility of families which lack love, trust and fairness.
He concludes, “Presumably, moral development fails to take place to the extent that these
conditions are absent” (p. 466, TJ). It is, therefore, an important empirical issue whether most
families are characterized by love, trust and fairness. If not, or if the family structure itself is
inimical to these relationships, then the moral powers will not be adequately developed.
30. See, e.g., Gupta, Sanjiv, “The Effects of Transitions in Marital Status on Men’s Performance of
Housework,” Journal of Marriage and the Family, vol. 61, August 1999, pp. 700-711; Hochschild,
Arlie, and Anne Machung, The Second Shift, New York: Viking, 1989 (revised edition, Penguin
Books, 2003); Shelton, B. A., Women, Men and Time: Gender Differences in Paid Work,
Housework and Leisure, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992.
31. In families where women do not work and are stay-at-home-parents, the gap is even more
significant. In these families, generally, wives are paid nothing for their labor, while husbands are
compensated for their out-of-home work.
32. See for example the U.S. Census Bureau’s Special Report entitled, “Evidence From Census
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/mckeen.html[9/18/2009 5:08:57 PM]
2000 About Earnings by Detailed Occupation,” released May 2004, the U.S. Department of Labor
study, “Women’s Earnings: An Overview,” Mary Bowler, Monthly Labor Review, December 1999,
and the U.S. Department of Labor study, “How Does Gender Play a Role in the Earnings Gap?,”
Stephanie Boraas and William Rodgers III, Monthly Labor Review, March 2003. See also Francine
Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, “Gender Differences in Pay,” Economic Perspectives, 14, Fall 2000,
pp. 75-99.
33. This fact also helps explain the “feminization of poverty”. That is, women and children are
more likely than men to live in poverty. U. S. Census Bureau, “Women and Men in the United
States: March 2002,” issued March 2003.
34. We thus cannot justify governmental interference with the family to rectify the gender-related
economic disparities, it seems. Because of the lexical ordering of the two principles of justice,
economic improvements cannot be traded off against any basic right guaranteed by the first
principle (such as the freedom of association). So, the state could not (however fancifully) mandate
that domestic labor be equally shared, since this might plausibly be regarded as interfering with the
rights of individuals to choose families where domestic labor is not equally shared.
35. We must realize that there may not be a clear bright line between childhood non-autonomy and
adult autonomy. For one, different individuals may develop their capacities for autonomous
decision-making at different ages. For two, it is plausible that autonomous decision-making
develops in degrees. For example, children at a certain point may be capable of making autonomous
decisions about matters which do not involve long-term projection (which clothes to wear on a
particular day, for example). But autonomous decision-making which involves potentially life-
altering matters or long-term planning may not be developed until much later.
36. These are families in which both wives and husbands work outside the home for pay, but in
which the wives also take on at least twice as much domestic work compared with their husbands.
Okin calls these “drudge wife households” (p. 36, Okin 1994).
37. As S. A. Lloyd and De Wijze point out, governmental regulation of domestic labor seems
overly intrusive (p. 279, De Wijze 2000; pp. 369, Lloyd 1994).
38. The sense of justice, for Rawls, involves at least two distinct capacities: (a) “the capacity to
understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair
terms of social cooperation”; and (b) “the willingness, if not the desires, to act in relation to others
on terms that they also can publicly endorse” (p. 19, PL). The capacity to for a conception of the
good is: “the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s own rational
advantage or good” (p. 19, PL). This capacity involves the ability to have a “conception of what is
valuable in human life” and the ability to form “a more or less determinate scheme of final
ends,...attachments,...and loyalties” (p. 19, PL).
39. See, e.g., p. 277, De Wijze 2000; pp. 364-365, Lloyd 1994.
40. Okin endorses a suggestion in this spirit when she proposes that the state require that each
married partner be equally entitled to any earnings of either spouse. This would, it is suggested,
allow wives responsible for the bulk of unpaid work to ‘earn’ a comparable income to their
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husbands and thus reduce the wage gap between men and women (Okin, Justice, Gender, and the
Family, Basic Books, New York, 1989.) Robert Card argues against this proposal in his paper,
“Gender, Justice Within the Family, and The Commitments of Rawlsian Liberalism,” Public Affairs
Quarterly, 15:2, April 2001, pp. 155-171.
41. I draw here on the account of family autonomy and family privacy provided by Shoeman 1980.
No doubt, though, my characterization of these features could be made sharper.
42. See, for example, the 1991 American Association of University Women study entitled,
“Shortchanging Girls, Shortchanging the Future” and Peggy Orenstein, SchoolGirls: Young Women,
Self-Esteem, and the Confidence Gap, Anchor Publishers, 1995.
43. Ron Mallon, “Political Liberalism, Cultural Membership, and the Family,” Social Theory and
Practice 25:2 (Summer 1999), pp. 271-297. Will Kymlicka endorses the “starting points” view in
his Liberalism, Community and Culture, Oxford, New York, 1989.
44. I disagree with Mallon on two key points: (a) I do not think that strong cultural membership is
necessary for having a starting conception of the good; (b) I do not think that families are the only
way that comprehensive doctrines can be transmitted, other non-public associations may do just as
well. I develop these points elsewhere. I do agree, however, that some starting points are necessary
in order for children to develop morally. And I agree that public institutions are disbarred, on
Rawlsian grounds, from transmitting comprehensive doctrines.
